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Article 
EDUCATION, AUTONOMY AND CIVIC VIRTUE 
Richard D<Jgger 
Article Summary: The major cause of our crisis in education is lack of agreement on the 
purpose of education. We can agree on what that purpose is, Richard Dagger argues. if 
we define it as the promotion of autonomy and civic virtue. Autonomy and civic virtue 
are often taken to be incompatible because one has to do with individual liberty and the 
other with collective responsibility. Dagger shows that the charge of incompatibility 
does not hold up under analysis. The two terms are, rather, complementary. 
Almost everyone agrees that we face an educational 
crisis in the United States today. There is less agreement, 
however, on the exact nature of the crisis and the proper 
response to it. This lack of agreement is itself significant, 
for the failure to agree on what we want our schools to do 
is largely responsible for the problems we now face. In the 
absence of such an agreement, we simply expect our 
schools to meet the demands of everyone vocal enough to 
make himself or herself heard. The result, according to 
John Chubb and Terry Moe, the authors of a recent and 
controversial book on America's schools, is that public 
schools "must make everyone happy by being all things to 
all people - just as politicians do (Politics, Markets and 
America's Schools, p. 54). 
If this is so, then what is to be done? Logically, there are 
only two alternatives to the present condition. The first is 
to try to find or forge a consensus on the proper purpose of 
education, then direct our schools to pursue that purpose. 
The second, abandoning hope of achieving this consensus, 
is to allow schools to define their own purposes by en-
couraging competition between a variety of schools pur-
suing a variety of goals. This is the point of the so-called 
choice approach advocated most recently by Chubb and 
Moe. As they see it, "schools have no immutable or tran-
scendent purpose. What they are supposed to be doing 
depends on who controls them and what these controllers 
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want them to do" (p. 30.) The solution, then, is to free in-
dividual schools to pursue whatever goals they deem ap-
propriate, thereby freeing parents and students to choose 
the schools most congenial to their inclinations. Schools 
should have to compete for customers in the marketplace, 
in other words, and successful schools, like successful 
magazines, will find "their niche - a specialized segment 
of the market to which they can appeal and attract sup-
port" (p. 55). 
There may be much to recommend this approach to ed-
ucation. It is only in its most extreme form, however, that 
educational "choice" escapes the need to arrive at some sort 
of agreement about the purpose of education. In Chubb 
and Moe's proposal, for instance, schools will have to 
meet certain standards - for teacher certification, gradua-
tion requirements, and nondiscrimination, among others 
- if they are to qualify for the public funds that follow 
students to the schools they and their parents choose. At 
some point, then, some public decision will have to be 
reached about what schools must and must not do. Even 
"voucher" proposals encounter this problem, for without 
some standards to determine what counts as an honest-to-
goodness school, anyone who teaches anything could 
have a claim on the public funds supporting the vouchers. 
The only way to escape this difficulty is to adopt an ex-
treme libertarian position and call for either anarchy or 
Robert Nozick's "minimal state," in which there will be 
neither public funding, nor public schools, nor any re-
quirement that anyone see to the education of children. 
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If we do not want to follow the market mentality all the 
way to anarchy or the minimal state, we shall have to face 
up to the task of forging an agreement on the purposes of 
education - or, more narrowly, of what we want our 
schools to do. This, to be sure, is no easy task in a society 
as diverse as ours; but neither is it an impossible one. 
There are educational goals, albeit quite general ones, on 
which we can and should agree. This is evident in the 
distinction we now draw implicitly between various 
specialized schools - business schools, dance schools, 
schools of broadcasting, and so on - and our schools 
simpliciter. The purpose of the latter is not to prepare peo-
ple for a specific career or activity, but in some way to 
prepare them for life. There is a difference, in other words, 
between training, which is the business of the specialized 
school, and education, which is the business of the school 
as such. 
These distinctions suggest that the task of reaching a 
consensus on the goals of our schools is not hopeless. Un-
fortunately, they do not take us very far toward ac-
complishing that task. One may doubt, for instance, that 
there is any great insight in the. observation that the 
business of the school is to educate. Even if we add that the 
purpose of education is in some way to prepare people for 
life, we still have to reach agreement on what "preparing 
people for life" entails. Given the variety of views in this 
country about how life should be lived, it is not easy to see 
how this can be done. My suggestion, however, is that we 
ought to think of preparation for life in terms of autonomy 
and civic virtue. 
It is often alleged that autonomy and. civic virtue are 
competing, or even incompatible, goods. Any steps we 
take to promote autonomy will come at the expense of 
civic virtue, according to this view, and vice versa. To ask 
schools to promote both, then, is to ask the impossible. In 
this essay I argue that autonomy and civic virtue, properly 
understood, are not incompatible, but complementary 
goals. I further suggest that autonomy and civic virtue 
provide better goals for our schools and our children than 
the competitive model so often favored by civic and busi-
ness leaders. 
Autonomy and Civic Virtue: Complementary Goals 
Autonomy and civic virtue are often taken to be incom-
patible with one another because one has to do with in-
dividual liberty, the other with collective responsibility. 
Autonomy requires people to look inward so that they 
may govern themselves, while civic virtue demands that 
they look outward and do what they can to promote the 
common good. The two concepts also seem to be at home 
in different traditions of political thought, or different 
forms of political discourse. Autonomy has been the con-
cern of liberals, on this view, while civic virtue has oc-
cupied the attention of classical republicans and com-
munitarians. Thus "autonomy" seems to be a key term in 
the "rights-talk" of liberal theorists, and "civic virtue" a key 
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term in a different vocabulary that centers on virtue. 
Autonomy and civic virtue are different from one 
another, of course; if they were identical, we presumably· 
would have no need for one of the two concepts. But this 
hardly proves them to be incompatible goods. The con-
nection between autonomy and liberalism, on the one 
hand, and civic virtue and republican or communitarian 
views, on the other, is not as strict or necessary as it may 
seem. Some liberal writers, such as John Stuart Mill and 
T.H. Green, seem to want to encourage civic virtue, even 
if they do not use the term. There are also writers of a 
republican bent, such as Rousseau, who are clearly con-
cerned with what we now call autonomy. I do not believe, 
then, that we must consign autonomy and civic virtue to 
distinct and incommensurable political traditions or 
"discourses" as necessarily incompatible terms. On the 
contrary, I believe that the two concepts exercise con-
siderable appeal today precisely because they indicate 
what is of value in these two, not altogether distinct, tradi-
tions of political thought. Rather than regard autonomy as 
a purely individualist notion and civic virtue as a collec-
tivist or communitarian ideal, we should look to their 
union as part of what Charles Taylor has called holist in-
dividualism, "a trend of thought that is fully aware of the 
(ontological) social embedding of human agents, but at the 
same time prizes liberty and individual differences very 
highly" ("Cross Purposes," in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., 
Liberalism and the Moral Life, p. 163). With that in mind, 
let us now take a closer look at the concepts in question. 
Autonomy as Self-Mastery 
Because autonomy is something we may predicate of a 
number of things - nation-states, corporations, and 
sewer districts, among them - it is necessary to be clear 
that my concern here is with the autonomy of the in-
dividual person. This is particularly important in view of 
the tendency of some writers on education to use "autono-
my" in the sense of a school's independence, or freedom 
from interference. There is nothing wrong with this usage, 
but it must not be confused with personal autonomy. 
The starting point is much the same, however. Whether 
we are referring to persons, schools, or nation-states, the 
literal meaning of 'autonomy' is still self-rule, self-
legislation, or self-government. The difficulty, of course, 
lies in determining what is involved in self-rule. But we 
may begin by noting that autonomy assumes a self that is 
capable of leading a self-governed life. 
At the conceptual core of autonomy is the notion of a 
self as a distinct person. Someone who cannot distinguish 
himself or herself from others cannot possibly lead a self-
governed life, for such a person cannot conceive of himself 
or herself as a person with a distinct identity; nor can so-
meone who suffers from some form of multiple or divided 
personalities. Autonomy implies, then, some fairly strong 
sense of selfhood - a sense that we do not expect infants 
to possess, but that we usually hope children will develop 
as they mature. 
If autonomy requires a fairly strong sense of self, it also 
requires that the self be capable of making choices. A per-
son is self-legislating, autonomous rather than heteron-
omous, to the extent that she chooses the principles by 
which she lives. But if she truly chooses the principles that 
guide her conduct, the autonomous person must be aware 
of the alternatives from which she can choose. Someone 
who does the right thing instinctively, without reflection, 
in the manner of Melville's Billy Budd, may be a good and 
decent person, but not an autonomous one. Autonomy re-
quires awareness: awareness of the choices open to us in 
life, and awareness also of our capacity to choose. If we 
can lead self-governed lives, then, it is because we are able 
to think of ourselves as more than objects at the mercy of 
forces over which we have no control, like so many leaves 
tossed about by the wind. 
Because these forces may be internal as well as external 
autonomy is sometimes regarded as self-mastery. Thi~ 
raises interesting and difficult problems, for it may be 
taken to mean that the self is not a single thing - or even 
that a person consists of more than one self. Sometimes 
people speak of a "lower" or "base" self, which leads us into 
temptation, and to which they oppose a "higher" or "true" 
self that struggles to keep us on the straight and narrow 
yath. The autonomous person, on this view, is the one 
who achieves self-mastery by suppressing the impulses of 
the lower self in order to follow the inclinations of the 
higher. 
To think in this way, however, is to misconceive auton~ 
omy. It misconceives autonomy because it leads to self-
denial, perhaps even self-destruction. On this view, in 
other words, self-mastery is much like the relationship be-
tween master and slave, with the higher self, usually con-
ceived to be reason or soul, called upon to exercise strict 
control over the lower, usually understood as appetite or 
flesh. But appetite or flesh, with all its insistent impulses, is 
natural to human beings, so the attempt to rise above and 
master it - and thus to divorce the "true" self from that 
'1ower" self rooted in nature - is necessarily a form of self-
denial. If we accomplish this denial, what is left? Pure 
reason or soul, all form and no content. 
What is the alternative? Do we want to say that the per-
son who acts on every fleeting impulse is autonomous? 
No, for there is a point to the distinction between 
autonomy and heteronomy; but it is a point that can be 
captured in a conception of autonomy that does not re-
quire a divided, contentious self. If the model of a 
heteronomous person is a creature of impulse, incapable 
of deferring gratification or exercising any control over his 
or her appetites, the model of the autonomous person is 
one who knows these appetites and inclinations (among 
other things) well enough to bring them into harmony, 
and thus to achieve integrity through their integration. 
This comes closer to self-realization than to self-denial. If it 
involves self-mastery, it is the craftsman's mastery of a 
craft - the mastery of an orchestra conductor, for in-
stance, or of the football quarterback who directs his 
teammates toward their goal - and not the mastery of the 
slaveowner. If autonomy is self-mastery, in short, it is 
mastery of self, not mastery over self. 
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Civic Virtue and Citizenship 
Unlike personal autonomy, which relates to the abstract 
notion of the self, civic virtue refers to a particular role 
that a person may occupy - the role of citizen. Someone 
exhibits civic virtue, that is, when he or she does what a 
citizen is supposed to do. In this respect civic virtue is like 
the other virtues, which typically related to the perfor-
mance of some role or the exercise of a certain skill. 
Our concept of virtue derives from the Greek arete, or 
excellence, by way of the Latin virtus, which carried from 
its association with vir (man) the additional connotations 
of strength and boldness. To be virtuous, then, was to ex-
hibit excellence in a particular skill or craft, or to perform 
admirably in a particular role or occupation. It was also 
possible to display a more general form of virtue by mani-
festing to a high degree the qualities of a good person. This 
was (and is) possible, however, only when there was (and 
is) some fairly dear notion of what a person is supposed to 
be. Personhood, in other words, must be conceived as a 
role that one may play, complete with criteria for deter-
mining when one is playing the role properly. In this sense 
a virtuous person is like a virtuoso musician, someone 
who does with great skill what a musician is supposed to 
do. 
This suggests that there is a conceptual connection be-
tween the ideas of virtue and of good. Just as it would be 
absurd to say that Jones is a virtuoso pianist, but not a 
good one, so it would be absurd to say that Smith is a vir-
tuous person, but not a good one. Such a connection does 
not hold between the ideas of autonomy and of good. We 
may think that autonomy itself is good, but we need not 
contradict ourselves when we say that Adams is an auton-
omous person, but not, all things considered, a good one. 
As a role-related concept, then, virtue refers to the 
disposition to act in accordance with the standards and ex-
pectations that define the role or roles a person performs. 
The more specific the role, the more specific the virtues 
associated with it will be. A steady hand may be among 
the virtues of a carpenter and a surgeon, for instance, but 
not of an accountant or poet. There are some character 
traits or dispositions that seem useful to almost everyone, 
however, and these are what we sometimes think of as "the 
virtues" - including the classical virtues of wisdom, 
courage, temperance, and justice, or a sense of propor-
tion. These are virtues - along with honesty, loyalty, 
compassion, and others - not so much because they work 
to the advantage of the person who possesses them, but 
because they work to the advantage of the people with 
whom he or she associates. Virtues are valuable because 
they promote the good of the community or society, not 
because they directly promote the good of the individual 
person. This may be why chastity, which no longer seems 
so vital to the welfare of society, may be less widely 
regarded as a virtue than once it was. 
To be virtuous, then, is to perform well a socially 
necessary or important role. This does not mean that the 
14 The Civic Arts Review 
virtuous person must always go along with the prevailing 
views or attitudes. On the contrary, Socrates and John 
Stuart Mill have persuaded many people to believe that 
questioning and opposing the prevailing views are among 
the highest forms of virtue. In making this case, however, 
they rely on the claim that the social gadfly and the unor-
thodox thinker are really promoting the long-run interests 
of society - and thereby performing a social role of excep-
tional value. 
Even if it might be shown that some virtues have no so-
cial value at all, it is clear that civic virtue will not be 
among them. Civic virtue simply is the disposition to do 
what is best for one's community, and to do it even - or 
especially ~ when one's private interest seems to point in a 
different direction. Understood in this way, civic virtue 
was a key concept of the classical republicans, and it sur-
vives today in the exhortations to do one's civic duty that 
regularly appear at election time. The fear of corruption 
and conflicts of interest also betray its traces. There are 
signs of a revival of a more straightforward appeal to civic 
virtue in the writings of various republican or communi-
tarian theorists, of course, and even some who identify 
themselves with liberalism are showing an open interest in 
civic virtue of some sort. So there is reason to believe that a 
brief examination of the classical republicans' conception 
of civic virtue is worthwhile. 
There appear to be three basic elements in civic virtue as 
the classical republican writers understood it. The first is 
the fear of corruption. Corruption is the opposite of vir-
tue, for it consists in shirking one's duty as a citizen. This 
could take the passive form of neglecting one's civic duties 
in favor of one's personal pleasures, such as indolence or 
the pursuit of luxury; or it could take the active form of ad-
vancing one's personal interests at the expense of the com-
mon good. This was most likely to happen when ambition 
and avarice, the desire for power and wealth, would tempt 
a citizen to overthrow the rule of law and install a tyranny 
in its place. 
The second key ingredient in the classical republicans' 
conception of civic virtue is fear of dependence. They 
regarded the citizen, following Aristotle, as someone who 
rules and is ruled in turn. The person who is completely 
dependent on another may be ruled, but is in no position 
to rule. The rule of law is essential, therefore, as a means of 
avoiding personal dependence. In a government of laws, 
not of men, the citizen is subject to the laws, not to the 
demands and whims of rulers who act without restraint. 
The republicans also typically defended private property 
as a way of guaranteeing that the citizen would not be 
dependent on others for his livelihood. Some, notably 
James Harrington and Rousseau, went further, suggesting 
that private property should be maintained, but distri-
buted in such a way as to prevent anyone from being so 
wealthy as to render other citizens dependent. As 
Rousseau put the point in the Social Contract (Book I, 
Chapter 9), everyone should have something, but no one 
too much. ll h . 
The fear of dependence indicates, fina y, t e impor-
tance of independence, or liberty, in the republicans' con-
ception of civic virtue. The virtuous citizen must be free, 
but not simply free to go his own way. This may be a form 
of freedom, but it is not a form of citizenship as they 
understood it. The citizen is free, they held, when he par-
ticipates in the government of his community. As part of 
the community, the citizen will recognize that the govern-
ment of common affairs is more or less directly self-
government. If it requires the occasional sacrifice of one's 
persona.I interests, so be it; for this is necessary not only in 
the name of civic duty, but also in order to enjoy the rights 
and liberties of the citizen in a self-governing polity. 
This, then, is what civic virtue was - and what it still is, 
according to those theorists who want to revive the repub-
lican spirit in contemporary politics. The question we 
must now consider is whether the revival of civic virtue is 
compatible with the desire for personal autonomy. I 
believe that it is. More than that, I believe that the three 
elements of the classical republicans' conception of civic 
virtue can help us see how the two may effectively comple-
ment one another. 
Personal Autonomy and Civic Virtue 
The autonomous person chooses the principles by 
which he or she will live, which implies some degree of 
critical reflection on the principles available. With civic 
virtue, however, the emphasis is not on choice, but on ac-
ting, perhaps without reflection, to promote the common 
good. The unquestioning soldier who makes the "ultimate 
sacrifice" for his or her country provides a good example. 
It is easy enough to see, then, how autonomy and civic vir-
tue can seem to be at odds with one another, for it is cer-
tainly possible for someone to exhibit civic virtue without 
being autonomous, just as it is possible for an autonomous 
person to put his or her well-being above the interests of 
anyone or anything else. 
But this is to say that personal autonomy and civic vir-
tue are different from one another, not that they are in-
compatible. It is also possible that their differences are 
complementary. To be precise, it is possible that autono-
my and civic virtue, properly understood, are related con-
cepts that can and should complement one another. 
Another look at the three principal elements of the 
classical republicans' conception of civic virtue should 
begin to make this clear. 
First, the republicans' fear of corruption is largely a fear 
of human weakness. Indolence and love of luxury, ambi-
tion and avarice - these vices constantly beckon people 
to forsake their civic duties and disregard the claims of the 
common good. The threat of corruption is graver at some 
times than others, they believed, but it is always a threat. 
To stave it off it is necessary to establish mixed govern-
ment and the rule of law, perhaps even to rotate public of-
fices among the citizenry and to prevent the concentration 
of wealth and property in the hands of a few. But these 
devices will never extirpate the threat, for it springs from 
selfish and ultimately self-defeating desires implanted in 
human nature. To hold them in check while directing peo-
ple's attention and devotion to the common good is, 
therefore, to achieve a form of self-mastery. In this 
respect, civic virtue and autonomy have something in 
common. 
This is true with regard to the second feature of civic vir-
tue as well. In this case the republicans' distinction be-
tween dependence and independence has a direct counter-
part in the distinction between heteronomy and autono-
my. The connection is probably clearest in the works of 
Rousseau, a republican writer who inspired the 
philosopher most often identified with the distinction be-
tween autonomy and heteronomy - Immanuel Kant. 
Rousseau proclaims that the only way to overcome 





to rely on the impartial rule of law and the general will. 
The general will, moreover, is not some disembodied force 
that resides in the community as a whole. Instead, it is the 
will that every citizen has as a citizen - the will to act in 
the public interest because that is the one interest all 
citizens share as citizens. If the rule of law frees people 
from their dependence on others, then, they will be free to 
make laws in accordance with the general will that each 
one shares. This, as Rousseau puts it in the Social Contract 
(Book I, Chapter 8), is "moral liberty," that is, living in ac-
cordance with laws that one makes for oneself. Another 
name for this is autonomy. 
The connection between autonomy and civic virtue is 
perhaps most obvious with regard to the third element of 
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civic virtue - the idea that liberty is participation in 
government, and therefore self-government. Since auton-
omy means "self-government," one might say that the con-
cept of civic virtue entails a commitment to autonomy, in 
some sense of the word. Again, this commitment is pro-
bably clearest in Rousseau's writings. For Rousseau, in 
fact, it seems not only that civic virtue entails self-
government, but that autonomy is possible only when 
civic virtue prevails. For unless the general will of the 
citizen takes precedence over the particular will of the 
man, in Rousseau's terms, no one can experience moral 
liberty. 
From the perspective of the classical republican concep-
tion of civic virtue, in short, autonomy and civic virtue are 
far from incompatible ideals. The same result emerges 
from a further analysis of the concept of autonomy. To be-
gin with, autonomy "has to be worked for," which leads 
Robert Young (Personal Autonomy, p. 9) and other philo-
sophers to regard it as "a character ideal or virtue. "More to 
the point, autonomy is not something that one can achieve 
solely through individual effort. It has to be worked for, 
certainly, but it also has to be cultivated or developed. An 
infant may have the ability to lead a self-governed life 
within her, like a seed, but this ability must be nourished 
and developed by others before she can ever hope to be 
autonomous. Recognizing this, the autonomous person 
should also recognize a duty of some sort to those whose 
help has made and continues to make it possible for her to 
lead a reasonably self-governed life. In a country or com-
munity in which this help sometimes takes the form of 
more or less impersonal public assistance or cooperation, 
the corresponding duty is a civic duty. Thus the 
autonomous person has a reason to exhibit civic virtue, at 
least when the community as a whole plays a significant 
part in fostering personal autonomy. 
Conclusion 
Bringing an end to the educational crisis in the United 
States requires a clear sense of the purpose or purposes of 
education. We can agree on what that purpose is, I have 
said, if we define it broadly as the promotion of autonomy 
and civic virtue. With these goals in mind, we can begin to 
discuss more productively the particular steps that need to 
be taken to improve our schools. Autonomy and civic vir-
tue will not tell us everything we need to know on these 
matters - they will not help us to choose between phonics 
and its rivals as a method of teaching reading, for instance 
16 The Civw Arts Review 
- but they can provide points of orientation from which 
people of diverse views can take their bearings. 
Now I want to conclude by indicating why I believe my 
approach is superior to what seems, judging from the 
statements of civic and business leaders, to be its chief rival 
- the view that the purpose of education is to prepare our 
children, and thus our country, for economic competition. 
There are three reasons why I think it is better to take 
autonomy and civic virtue as our goals. The first is that an 
education for autonomy and civic virtue will give as much 
time and attention to the basic skills as the competitive 
model, thus promising to accomplish what the competi-
tive model wants to accomplish. Second, the approach I 
have defended is more comprehensive and accommodat-
ing than the competitive model. It can help to prepare 
children for competition, that is, but it will also give them 
a wider vision, thereby offering an opportunity for growth 
to those who decide, upon reflection, that the competitive 
life is not the life they want to lead. It should also prove 
valuable in helping students to become adaptable - a trait 
that is supposed to be increasingly important in a world of 
"career burnout" and rapid change. 
Finally, the competitive model points in two 
undesirable directions. On the one hand, it encourages us 
to think of children as resources to be marshalled in the 
struggle to maintain our national economic strength. On 
the other, it leads children to see themselves as isolated in-
dividuals locked in competition with one another - com-
petition for jobs, money, and status. Thus the competitive 
model points either in a collectivist or an intensely in-
dividualist direction. In the first case it devalues the in-
dividual, who becomes a mere resource; in the second it 
affords little hope of maintaining social bonds and 
loyalties. In the first case it denies autonomy; in the se-
cond, civic virtue. Neither of these is acceptable. 
With autonomy and civic virtue, however, we have the 
basis for an education grounded in holist individualism. 
Such an education proceeds from the view that no one is a 
self-created person, yet almost everyone has the capacity 
to exercise a considerable degree of control over his or her 
life. This capacity ought to be developed, furthermore, for 
it is a vital part of a worthwhile life; and a society that en-
courages the development of this capacity deserves the 
support of those it helps in this way. Autonomy and civic 
virtue are not, on this view, incompatible goods, but two 
sides of the same conception of the relationship between 
individuals and the political order. o 
